The Resilience and Response of Farm Households in the Aftermath of the 2006 Canterbury Snow Storm
Research findings
Preparedness
Most farmers interviewed felt that the snow storm was, at least on reflection, not too traumatic. Most got through it in reasonably good shape and had minimal stock losses, although many admitted it was a particularly stressful time associated with a significant financial cost. All those farmers interviewed believed that they were pretty well prepared for such an event, even though three conceded that they had left stock too high on the hills too late in the year.
Most farmers had experienced at least one adverse event before the snow, including the major snows of 1992, 1973, 1967; floods (especially in 1986); frequent droughts; gale force wind storms; and in one case devastating hail. They attributed their preparedness to personal experience and/or the snow history of the region, believing it sensible to take some precautions against such an event.
Interviewees offered a number of reasons why they thought some farmers were not prepared for the snow storm, including being new to the region, lacking experience of snow events, complacency, naivety, the financial cost of being ‘fully’ prepared, the timing of the snow (12 June was much earlier than many previous snow events), or as one well-prepared farmer noted:
“Bad management, exacerbated by the dry autumn, meant some farmers pushed things to the limit.” (Sheep/beef farmer)
Furthermore, although most inland farms receive some snow every year, a snow event of such magnitude was not expected down to sea level; thus, many coastal farmers were caught unprepared. However, a number of factors, including the amount and duration of snow cover in coastal areas, and fewer blocked roads meant that the impact on coastal farms was generally not as severe on farms further inland.
Little correlation, however, was found between preparedness and such factors as farm type, size of farm, time of residence in the region, and past experience of snows. Rather, preparedness for an adverse event seems to be related to individual personalities. Even those interviewees who were new to the region were commonly as well prepared as more established farm families (despite many established farmers believing that ‘new farmers’ would not be prepared). Most newcomers explained that they had ‘done their homework’ on the area.
Most farmers had taken a number of direct and indirect measures in preparation for a snow event, including having four-wheel drive tractors, having planted plenty of shelter belts on their farm and ensuring that they went into the winter with between 1½ to 2½ ‘average’ winters’ worth of feed on hand. However, much of the region had experienced a dry summer and autumn, and most farmers had begun feeding out by April (one as early as February). As a result, even before the snow storm, many farmers had had to purchase extra feed to top up winter stores. Some farmers had snow blades, or could borrow these from neighbours, and some had access to bulldozers or helicopters. Most farmers had comprehensive insurance. However, as one farmer noted:
“You can always be more prepared, but at some stage you have to draw a line at what is realistic. Each event is unique in its timing and effects, so to an extent you have to take it as it comes.” (Intensive sheep farmer)
In terms of home preparedness, all farmers had a log burner and most had wetbacks, a coal range for cooking, gas barbecues, candles, torches, batteries, camping gear and one to two weeks’ food stored. Many had a gravity water supply. A few farmers, prior to the storm, already had generators that could be used to run part of the home or farm; however, many farmers purchased small generators 5–7 days after the snow to run the TV, lights and a few kitchen appliances. One family adopted the idea of using solar garden lights as a substitute for candles and to provide extra safety precautions for their young children. These measures meant that most families survived at a reasonable level of comfort. Log burners (especially those that could be cooked on) and wetbacks were considered absolutely indispensable; consequently, many farmers felt that the banning of these by the Council could have a severe adverse impact if or when a similar adverse event occurred in the future.
At the same time, few families had specific contingency plans for the family or farm in the face of a snow or any other adverse event, although many did have a predetermined meeting place for a fire. This also raised the issue of hazard identification. Many farmers have never considered to what hazards their farm may be vulnerable; in fact, a number of those farmers interviewed believed that many particular hazards were no threat to their property, and accordingly had made no contingency plans:
“No chance of flood.” (Beef/pig farmer, on flats)
Impacts
The differing types of farm business, terrain, the location of farms and distance from a town, meant that the snow had a unique impact on each individual household. However, a number of common themes emerged. Those included the loss of communication services (landline phones and cellular phones), loss of power, road closures, damage to trees and fences, issues relating to the feeding of stock and the longevity of the snow, and the resulting financial and psychological stress.
Stock
Stock losses were minimal on most farms, including high country farms; however, there were a few potential animal welfare cases. When the snow struck, some farmers still had sheep up on the hills as the dry summer and autumn had resulted in the availability of less feed, despite the accepted practice being to bring stock down in April. These farms experienced the highest stock losses. On some farms deer fared particularly badly, especially when heavy frosts set in, killing many animals. Other farmers, however, believed that their deer fared better than sheep or cattle.
The timing of the snow storm (12 June) was crucial as stock were not yet lambing or calving. Many farmers believed that had the snow fallen in August (as in 1992) stock losses would have been disastrous. As noted above, much of the region had experienced a very dry summer and autumn and some farmers had begun feeding out winter feed as early as February. The result was that many farmers already had low feed stocks when the snow came. Even so, most farmers had enough or nearly enough feed to last through the snow and its aftermath and only had to buy in a small amount of feed or in some cases none at all. Most interviewees believed that a second snow event would have caused devastating stock losses as by then, feed stores had been run down or exhausted and the animals had lost much condition. Fear of a second major storm was a significant stress for the farmers (and for Civil Defence and all other officials concerned).
That the snow fell so early in winter (12th June – that is, before the shortest day of the year) caused a different impact from previous major Canterbury snows (which occurred later in the winter). While past snows remained for 2–3 weeks, in some areas the June 2006 snow was still present on farms, including on the lawns of some farm homesteads, seven weeks after the event. This was aggravated by the snow storm coinciding with the coldest June in over 50 years; the snow froze in most places after about 5–7 days. Many farmers recorded frosts of between
-10˚C to -18˚C, and on many days temperatures struggled to get far above 0˚C.
Once stock had been brought to a suitable place for feeding out, the frozen snow was an advantage, insofar as it reduced the vulnerability of the ground to trampling. However, once the snow melted, mud became a major problem and much feed was wasted by being trampled into soft ground.
On-farm damage
Significant damage occurred to trees, fences and spouting. Tree branches broke as a result of the weight of snow; in fact, many farmers first realised there would be a problem when they woke up around 2am on the Monday morning to the sound of breaking branches. Fencing wires also broke due to falling branches or the weight of the snow. Snow accumulating on roofs broke guttering and spouting, and due to the extra demand for tradesmen many farmers had still not been able to get these fixed (despite having insurance) nearly eight months after the snow.
Roads
In most cases roads were reopened after 2 or 3 days, especially major roads and those roads nearest to towns; however, some of the more remote roads and side roads were not opened until about a week after the event. Farmers were upset as this meant that while tourists could travel through the region they could not get off their properties. Many farmers who had a snow plough or blade often assisted in clearing these back roads. There were, however, some problems as a result of some roads only having one lane open. This would have been worse if traffic volumes had been higher, but farmers still told of having to reverse a few hundred metres or more until oncoming vehicles could pass. Many farmers also complained of graders clearing roads, but not driveways, and as a result the snow cleared from the main road formed a barrier across driveways, blocking entrance and exit.
Power
Most farms lost power for between seven and fourteen days. Non-functioning electric fences were the major on-farm impact and allowed cattle to mob. Piggeries were insulated and power was restored before inside temperatures dropped low enough to affect the animals. Many interviewees said that they lost power for a day or so during most winters due to snow, wind or automobile accidents, so they were prepared for such an event (although perhaps not one of such long duration) and that although it was an annoyance, it was not the worst impact of the snow event.
Telecommunications
The single biggest impact mentioned by interviewees was the loss of telecommunications, that is, phone and cellular phones. Most farms lost phone links for between three and seven days. Cell phone reception was also lost for up to 14 days following the exhaustion of battery reserves at transmitting stations, and no recharging as a result of lack of any electricity. While many farmers believed that they could cope with the power being out for a few days, and that a couple of days isolation because of road closure was tolerable, no phone communication, in some cases for up to seven days, was viewed as completely unacceptable:
“What happened with the phones never should have occurred, especially not in this day and age with the technology we now have.” (Extensive sheep/beef/deer farmer)
The blame for the loss of cell phone coverage was largely placed on Telecom. Farmers believed that the company had let them down and should be held accountable. A common opinion was that:
“Telecom doesn’t understand rural issues.” (Sheep/beef farmer)
And:
“Farmers are expected to invest in being prepared, but Telecom isn’t. They are too profit driven. They don’t get a return on their investment in rural preparedness.” (Dairy farmer)
The lack of phone links was viewed as a major problem, principally because of the restrictions it placed on maintaining community contact and cohesion. In particular, the reduced ability to readily contact friends and neighbours to check on them, and to communicate with family and friends outside of the region to let them know the situation increased the feelings of isolation associated with being confined to the farm and increased stress. Safety issues were also a major concern following the loss of phone links. Some farmers related how they or their neighbour had slipped into an unseen (snow-covered) ditch or gully on their tractor. In such cases farmers believed that it was fortunate no one was injured, as there would have been little chance of contacting any emergency services required. Concern that a child or elderly family member or neighbour could have taken ill, and help had not been available, further worried many farm households. The situation was put in perspective by one farmer who noted that:
“Civil Defence told us to ring them if there was an emergency…we had no phone!” (Intensive sheep farmer)
The many hills, valleys, ridges and high mountains in the area means that cell phone reception is patchy at best, with only some correlation between distance from town and network coverage. Some farmers with good or even reasonable cell phone reception on their properties often carry a cell phone as a safety measure. Many wives had been worried when husbands had not returned from snow raking at the expected time as there was no way to contact them. Even when cell phone reception was re-established, phones themselves remained useless to most until the power was restored and phone batteries could be recharged.
Many farmers felt that the phone debacle arose from the privatising this essential service and many believed:
“It would have been fixed quicker in the old days.” (Intensive sheep farmer)
Yet interestingly, in spite of privatisation, farmers believed that the government should still be accountable for essential services:
“The communication breakdown (that is, phones and cell phones) must NEVER happen again.” (Extensive sheep/beef/deer farmer)
Farmers had hoped to be provided with better information about reconnection of power and phone services. They understood the difficulty and extent of the problem, but this information would have allowed for them to better plan, for example, whether or not to buy a generator.
Most farmers saw no alternative to the use of conventional telephone and cellular telephone networks. While a radio telephone network in the Mackenzie district existed, the majority of farmers were unaware of its existence and certainly did not know who the local operator was or how to access the system.
Stress
The snow created a lot of extra work for farmers. Their immediate response following the snowfall was to check on their stock. For some, this meant snow raking, while others with more gentle terrain were able to access stock using four wheel drive tractors. Stock was generally brought to a location where feeding out was easier. In some cases, for example on flat terrain or on small farms, this took only a day or two. However, some larger farms were still snow raking five or more days after the storm. Even when locating and moving stock had been completed, feeding out was still a time-consuming practice because of the depth of the snow. The reduced daylight hours during mid winter often left farmers with little time to tackle other tasks such as clearing fallen branches and trees off fences, and mending or replacing fences. In some cases streams also had to be cleared of trees and branches to prevent flooding when the snow finally did melt.
After six weeks of working in the snow, many farmers were at their wits’ end and some even:
“… questioned whether farming was the right profession.” (Sheep/deer farmer)
Stress was also caused by animals dying, and wondering if a second snow would occur:
“If a second snow had occurred, I think it would have broken a few farmers.” (Sheep farmer)
Although 2006 was a poor financial year for many due to lost production, the need to purchase extra feed, and stock losses, most farmers recovered reasonably well from the storm due to good spring and summer growth, and are now “… trying to move on and look ahead to this year (2007).” (Sheep/beef farmer)
Cold
The cold made work more difficult. Farmers ate more and fed their dogs and stock more, and had to work wearing cumbersome heavy snow gear. Diesel freezing (waxing) was an issue in some cases, as was machinery break-downs. This was exacerbated as local mechanics were inundated with work and could not meet farmers’ needs.
Expectation of assistance
Farmers tend to have an independent spirit and a cynical view of the government’s outlook on farming and consequently had little expectation of assistance, especially if it could be construed as a ‘hand out’:
“Farms are just like any other business. Farmers need to practise risk management and be self-sufficient.” (Sheep/beef/deer farmer)
Some did mention that a subsidy on the transport of feed would have been welcome, especially for those in remote locations, but others felt this could have been too easily abused. Other farmers asked:
“Why should poor managers get assistance, but good managers with enough feed miss out? Where is the line drawn? Who decides what assistance will be available and for whom?” (Deer and sheep farmer)
It was also mentioned that assistance could lead to situations where farmers would do less to prepare themselves for an adverse event, knowing that the government would bail them out. However, at least some expressed frustration at the expectation that they be self sufficient when essential services were out of order:
“Farmers are expected to be self-sufficient. We can only be independent or self-sufficient if essential services are operating.” (Sheep/beef/deer farmer)
There was, however, a definite expectation of assistance from Civil Defence.
Contact for Enquiries
North Island
Phil Journeaux
Manager
North Island Regions
Sector Performance Policy
MAF Policy
Private Bag 3123
Hamilton
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 7 957 8314
Fax: +64 7 957 8315
South Island
John Greer
Regional Team Leader
Natural Resources Group
MAF Policy
PO Box 20 280
Christchurch
NEW ZEALAND
Phone: +64 3 943 1703
Fax: +64 3 943 1757
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